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NOTE

Dual Environmentalism:
Demand Response Mechanisms in
Wholesale and Retail Energy Markets
SARAH M. MAIN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Electricity production is the collectively most carbon-intensive
process on the planet.1 The predominant use of fossil fuels to meet
growing electricity demand makes electric power generation a key
contributor to global carbon emissions.2 In 2015, fossil fuelpowered generators produced 67 percent of United States
electricity demand and contributed to 37 percent of the country’s
carbon emissions – more than any other economic sector.3 As the
* Sarah M. Main is a third-year J.D. and Environmental Law Certificate
candidate at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. She received
a Bachelor of Arts, summa cum laude, in Environmental Studies and Political
Science with honors from Saint Michael’s College in 2013. She is a member of Phi
Beta Kappa, Delta Epsilon Sigma, and Pi Sigma Alpha national academic honor
societies. She has focused her studies on renewable and alternative energy
transitions, government policy, and international climate initiatives. The author
would like to thank John Bowie for sparking her interest in the subject matter,
Noah Shaw for prompting her to think about the subject matter in different
contexts, and the Pace Environmental Law Review for entertaining her musings
on the subject matter.
1. Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, EPA, http://www3.epa.gov/
climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html
[https://perma.cc/76XZ-7XZ5]
(last
updated Aug. 9, 2016).
2. Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, http://www3.epa.gov/
climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/electricity.html [https://perma.cc/Z4RP-WT
29] (last updated Oct. 6, 2016).
3. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy
Source?, EIA, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3 [https://
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primary driver of global climate change, atmospheric carbon
dioxide is the most detrimental consequence of turning on the
lights.4 In addition to the alarming amount of carbon dioxide
emitted from this single, essential process, methane and nitrous
oxide are also released, exacerbating the heat-trapping potential of
the atmosphere.5 With the United States’ energy-related carbon
dioxide emissions rising 1 percent each year, major electric power
industry reforms are necessary to mitigate widespread, adverse,
environmental impacts and avoid catastrophic climate change.6
Carbon dioxide is emitted in electricity production when fossil
fuel-fired generators burn coal, oil, and natural gas to release heat
energy.7 Before the combustion of carbon-dense fossil fuels even
occurs, the processes by which these resources are mined and
extracted creates an additional, massive environmental impact.8
perma.cc/WX94-FKU9] (last updated Apr. 1, 2016); U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
How Much of U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions are Associated with Electricity
Generation?, EIA, [https://perma.cc/KJD5-AY7X] (last updated Apr. 1, 2016).
Agriculture, forestry, and other land uses came in close second for global carbon
emissions, at 24%. Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, supra note 1. In 2014,
the generation of electricity accounted for 25 percent of all global carbon
emissions. Id. Data for 2013-2014 is based on the IPCC’s 2014 global emissions
report, using emissions data from 2010. Id.; Understanding the IPCC Reports,
WORLD RES. INST., http://www.wri.org/ipcc-infographics [https://perma.cc/3MVGP6L6].
4. Why Does CO2 Get Most of the Attention When There Are So Many Other
Heat Trapping Gases (Greenhouse Gases)?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/CO2-andglobal-warming-faq.html#.VtzNTJMrKHo [https://perma.cc/R2C8-ZLB4].
5. Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, supra note 1.
6. Understanding the IPCC Reports, supra note 3; SUSAN JOY HASSOL,
PRESIDENTIAL CLIMATE ACTION PROJECT, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: EMISSIONS
REDUCTIONS NEEDED TO STABILIZE CLIMATE (2007), https://www.climate
communication.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/presidentialaction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4LD7-4Y69].
7. CO2 Emissions Associated with Biomass Use at Stationary Sources, EPA,
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/biogenicemissions.html
[https://perma.cc/X5TX-U4MN] (last updated Sept. 26, 2016). Carbon dioxide is
also emitted in the burning of biomass fuels, like biogas and wood; however, the
carbon dioxide released from biomass is considered biogenic carbon. Id. Biogenic
carbon dioxide is associated with the natural carbon cycle. Id. Forest-derived and
agriculture-derived fuels sequester carbon from the atmosphere during
photosynthesis. Id. When burned, these fuels release the carbon dioxide that,
unlike coal, oil, and natural gas, was originally removed from the natural carbon
cycle. Id.
8. Nathalie Butt & Hawthorne Beyer, Leave It in the Ground! How Fossil
Fuel Extraction Affects Biodiversity, CONVERSATION (Oct. 24, 2013, 3:44 PM),
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The extraction and combustion processes significantly contribute
to global climate change long before the transmission, distribution,
and often wasteful consumption of electricity takes place.
Despite growth in the renewable energy sector, non-renewable
fossil fuels are the primary fuel source in the United States and
around the world.9 The type of fuel used in energy production –
whether natural gas, coal, wind, or solar – can affect the carbon
footprint of the entire grid operation.10 However, fuel source is only
one factor in the environmental impact equation. Aging
infrastructure throughout the United States has made the
transmission and distribution of electricity less efficient and
unreliable.11 Upgrading infrastructure and moving generation
closer to the source of consumption requires hefty investments and
is associated with its own slew of negative environmental
impacts.12 Thus, a key approach to mitigating climate change

http://theconversation.com/leave-it-in-the-ground-how-fossil-fuel-extractionaffects-biodiversity-19484 [https://perma.cc/Y49X-5UMQ]. The extraction of fossil
fuels is associated with potential environmental hazards, including habitat
destruction and fragmentation which threaten biodiversity, the production of
toxic wastes and heavy metals which pollute flora and fauna habitats and
contaminate groundwater, noise and air pollution which affect human and animal
species alike, land subsidence, alterations in the water table, and facilitation of
invasive species and pathogens, among other direct and indirect environmental
harms. Id.
9. Energy and Global Warming, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/energy_and_g
lobal_warming/ [https://perma.cc/R79F-UAM9]; see WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL,
WORLD ENERGY RESOURCES: 2013 SURVEY 6 (2013), https://www.worldenergy.org/
wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/Complete_WER_2013_Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DR3T-E7RR].
10. See WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 4.
11. See ALISON SILVERSTEIN, TRANSMISSION 101: NCEP TRANSMISSION
TECHNOLOGIES WORKSHOP 25-26 (2011), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/energy/
ASilverstein4-20-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGF6-8WHH].
12. See id. at 17-26. This note does not address technical advancements to
electric grid infrastructure that could improve the efficiency of electricity
transport and distribution. While a large amount of energy is lost in transmission
and distribution (6% in 2014), this note focuses primarily on the role of demand
response in mitigating the adverse environmental impacts of the electric power
industry. U.S. Energy Info. Admin, How Much Energy is Lost in Transmission
and Distribution in the United States?, EIA, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/
faq.cfm?id=105&t=3 [https://perma.cc/SM5G-W6RJ] (last updated Apr. 6, 2016).
As of the writing of this note, the United States is actively studying ways to
modernize the electric grid. The Department of Energy anticipates that “in the
next two decades, large transmission and distribution investments will be made
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effects, and internalizing the environmental externalities
associated with electricity production and consumption, is to alter
the way end-use customers consume electricity.13
Reducing consumption can shape market preferences for fuel
sources, promoting renewable and cleaner-burning fuels over
costly fossil fuel resources.14 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply
Association, wholesale energy market conditions did not give retail
customers a clear incentive to cut consumption.15 To incentivize
energy conservation in the interim, state and federal entities
implemented programs to motivate change in electricity
consumption.16 Demand response is one such mechanism.

to replace aging infrastructure; maintain reliability; enable market efficiencies;
and aid in meeting policy objectives, such as greenhouse gas reduction and state
renewable energy goals.” U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REPORT:
ENERGY TRANSMISSION, STORAGE, AND DISTRIBUTION INFRASTRUCTURE (2015),
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/04/f22/QER-ALL%20FINAL_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/92YA-8764].
13. See David Nemtzow et al., The Green Effect, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2007,
at
42,
https://www.scc.virginia.gov/pue/conserve/c_2/cn_consdem_0307.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BG46-VALW].
14. See generally id. at 42 (discussing studies that reveal customer responses
to feedback on electricity consumption); TOM OVERBYE ET AL., POWER SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING RESEARCH CENTER, THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY AND CLIMATE
CHANGE:
POWER
SYSTEMS
RESEARCH
POSSIBILITIES
33-35
(2007),
http://pserc.wisc.edu/documents/. . ./2007. . ./M-19_Final-Report_June-2007.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C38Y-SCG5]. While the cost of oil per kilowatt hour may be
lower for the end-use customer than a kilowatt of wind- powered electricity,
“costly” here considers the externality costs of both renewable and non-renewable
resources, making non-renewables costlier than renewable alternatives. See Dana
Nuccitelli, Fossil Fuels are Way More Expensive Than You Think, GUARDIAN (Mar.
15, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus
-97-per-cent/2015/mar/18/fossil-fuels-are-way-more-expensive-than-you-think
[https://perma.cc/G7GC-YQ7B].
15. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016); STEVEN D.
BRAITHWAIT ET AL., THE ROLE OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRIC POWER MARKET
DESIGN 5 (2002) [https://perma.cc/9FPG-TNWZ].
16. For a state-level programs, see New York’s retail demand response
initiatives. William Opalka, Demand Response for All Coming to New York, RTO
INSIDER (June 22, 2015), http://www.rtoinsider.com/new-york-demand-response15883 [https://perma.cc/5UY7-4LCM]. For a federal assessment of demand
response programs, see FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND
RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING 5 (2014), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staffreports/2014/demand-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N2D-Q2ZR].
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Demand response programs exist in both wholesale and retail
energy markets.17 Demand response may take the form of financial
incentives to lower electricity consumption during peak demand
periods, or permission for retail customers to bid reductions in use
into the wholesale market at specified prices.18 Because demand
response has numerous environmental and economic benefits,19 its
potential to shape environmentally-conscious energy regulation is
promising. Despite the clear potential of demand response in
mitigating climate change and environmental degradation, the
direct impact of demand response on the environment has been
largely unexplored.20 Both wholesale and retail demand response
programs aim to shape the consumption behaviors of end-use
customers, and thus, the environmental benefits associated with
demand response are specific to the location of the consumer.21 For
these reasons, states and local entities may be better suited to
design environmentally conscious demand response programs
than a federal oversight agency. Nevertheless, federal regulation
is needed to obtain environmental benefits, even locally.
In the 2016 case of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) v. Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”), the
Supreme Court was faced with determining FERC’s authority over
demand response markets.22 FERC is an independent government
agency created within the Department of Energy to ensure the
protection of energy consumers and the public by monitoring the

17. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Demand Response, ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/
oe/technology-development/smart-grid/demand-response [https://perma.cc/8PDEC3LX].
18. BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 15, at 3.
19. Id. at 5. To name a few environmental benefits associated with demand
response, reduced consumption during peak hours can diminish the need to
dispatch polluting gas generators, thereby reducing carbon emissions; alleviate
constraints in generation and transmission that result in energy lost in the form
of heat, making the grid more efficient and reliable, which is associated with
numerous environmental benefits; decrease overall demand for electricity,
negating pressure to build costly, polluting, fossil-fueled power plants. Id.
20. See Nemtzow et al., supra note 13, at 41.
21. See id.
22. See FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016); Robert
Walton, Updated: Supreme Court Hears Arguments Over FERC Demand
Response Rule, UTILITY DIVE (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/
updated-supreme-court-hears-arguments-over-ferc-demand-responserule/407293
[https://perma.cc/LT6M-9MFA].
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legality of regulated energy companies.23 The issue raised
questions about the division of power between the state and federal
government over electricity markets.24 The Court ultimately ruled
that FERC was within its jurisdiction when it used its rulemaking
authority to allow retail demand response providers to sell into the
wholesale market.25 FERC was also acting within its jurisdiction
by requiring that retail providers be paid for demand response at
the same price as wholesale generators.26 Despite initial concerns
over separation of powers, the Supreme Court’s ruling provides
room for states to play an integral part in the development and
deployment of an environmental regulatory scheme. FERC v.
EPSA and combined challenges set important precedent for the
future of demand response and the permissible degree of federal
oversight.27
This note argues that a dual jurisdictional approach to
demand response programming is better suited to mitigate
environmental harms than an “either-or” regulatory model.28
Through an exploration of FERC’s authority over wholesale
demand response, state authority over retail-level demand
response, and implications for electricity and capacity markets
arising out of the Court’s decision in FERC v. EPSA, this note will
offer effective legal mechanisms for mitigating environmental
costs, while fostering environmental benefits. The next section of
this note analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of state and
federal regulatory approaches to demand response in isolation.

23. What Is FERC?, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/
students/whatisferc.asp [https://perma.cc/MFS9-X2DE]. FERC’s responsibilities
include “regulating the interstate transmission of natural gas, oil, and electricity;
regulating the wholesale sale of electricity (individual states regulate retail
sales); . . .monitoring and investigating energy markets” and other wholesale
market oversight, the siting of applications for electric transmission, and
ensuring the reliability of the electric grid. Id.
24. Walton, supra note 22.
25. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 784.
26. Id.
27. See id. FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, No. 14-840 (U.S. Jan. 25,
2016) was combined with EnerNoc, Inc. v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, No. 14841 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016) (together commonly referred to as EPSA II) upon a
granting of certiorari.
28. That is, as EPSA argued in support of, a state or federal approach with
clear distinctions between the bounds of state jurisdiction in retail markets and
FERC jurisdiction over wholesale markets.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4
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Based on this assessment, this note suggests the policy
mechanisms most conducive to environmentally-conscious electric
energy regulation. This note concludes with a model regulatory
scheme that utilizes demand response to mitigate global climate
change and advance environmental sustainability.
II. BACKGROUND ON WHOLESALE AND RETAIL
ENERGY AND CAPACITY MARKETS
An introduction to wholesale and retail market structures is
necessary to understand the jurisdictional implications arising out
of FERC v. EPSA. In each market, numerous players are involved
in the procurement, management, regulation, and sale of
electricity. These players have varying degrees of authority, each
occupying a niche role in the market. The division of power
between these wholesale and retail entities, and the extent to
which they can be regulated by oversight agencies, should be
considered in incorporating demand response into an
environmental regulatory scheme. “Enlightened regulators will
escape from zero-sum, ‘federal vs. state’ mindsets, instead focusing
on which regulatory actors are best positioned to make which
decisions.”29
The electricity market is made up of wholesale and retail
market components.30 The wholesale market comprises the
supply-side of the electricity market, beginning with the
conversion of fuel to energy and energy to electricity, and the
subsequent distribution of that electricity from power providers to
electric utilities.31 Wholesale power exists at the high-voltage
points in the electric system, before the electricity flowing through
transmission wires is stepped down to lower voltages for

29. Scott Hempling, The Supreme Court Saves Demand Response: Now
What?, SCOTT HEMPLING LAW (Feb. 2016), http://www.scotthemplinglaw.com/
essays/the-supreme-court-saves-demand-response
[https://perma.cc/9TWU-B2
6Z].
30. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY
MARKET BASICS 35 (2015), http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energyprimer.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AKM-EA9R].
31. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Understanding the Markets, NYISO,
http://www.nyiso.com/public/about_nyiso/understanding_the_markets/wholesale
_retail/index.jsp [https://perma.cc/U8RD-72Z2].
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consumption.32 Wholesale power begins at the generator –
typically a coal or natural gas-fired power plant – where fossil fuel
combustion produces steam that is converted into electricity.33 The
electricity is then powered up to high voltages to send over longdistance transmission lines.34 The electricity enters the retail
market when transformers step it down to low voltages for
consumption.35
The wholesale electricity market involves the sale of electricity
amongst generators and owners of transmission, as well as electric
utilities and traders.36 FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale
energy markets, which cross state lines and sell electricity in
interstate commerce.37 The wholesale market is divided into three
regions of multi-state interconnections – the Western
Interconnection, Eastern Interconnection, and Electric Reliability
Council of Texas Interconnection.38 Within these interconnections,
Regional Transmission Operators (“RTOs”) and Independent
System Operators (“ISOs”) manage transmission and engage in the
interstate sale of electricity on a regional basis.39 Each of these
wholesale market operators administers a portion of the country’s
electric grid and provides generators access to transmission
infrastructure.40 FERC dictates the wholesale prices for electricity,
and may choose to base that determination on either the market
price of energy, or the costs of generation and transmission.41
The retail market comprises the demand side of the electric
system, or the sale of electricity to customers.42 Retail power
companies, such as electric utilities and energy service providers,
purchase power through their ISO’s or RTO’s regional wholesale

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
What is FERC?, supra note 23, at 35.
Electricity Primer- The Basics of Power and Competitive Markets, ELEC.
POWER SUPPLY ASS’N, https://www.epsa.org/industry/primer/?fa=wholesaleMar
ket [https://perma.cc/CYL9-RJ2Q].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (2016).
41. See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, supra note 30.
42. See id.
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market.43 This power is generated and transmitted in the
wholesale market.44 When the power reaches transformers at the
customer end of the electric grid, it is stepped down to low
voltage.45 After being distributed to local power lines across a
series of switchboards, the electricity reaches the end-use
customer, who pays the retail price for their consumption.46
In the retail market, electric utility companies and energy
service companies (“ESCOs”) sell power to individuals, businesses,
and other end-use customers.47 Utilities are subject to the
jurisdiction of the state public service commission or public utility
commission, and are typically granted an exclusive service
territory in exchange for providing services to customers.48
Distribution utilities or electric utilities with this service obligation
are called Load Serving Entities (“LSEs”), due to their role in
supplying load, or electricity, to customers.49
Various categories of customers exist within a service
territory, such as commercial, residential, and industrial
customers.50 The customer’s electric rate is based on the category
in which the customer falls.51 The utility has a number of rate
43. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, supra note 31.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Colin Fitzsimmons, What is the Role of the Utility vs. Retail Energy
Provider?, DIRECT ENERGY BUS. (May 18, 2015), https://www.business.
directenergy.com/blog/2015/may/what-is-the-role-of-the-utility-versus-a-retailenergy-provider [https://perma.cc/S8ZZ-NF5F]. ESCOs are commercial or nonprofit businesses that provide a range of energy solutions, including the
development, design, construction, and funding of projects that save energy,
reduce energy costs, and reduce operational and maintenance costs for customer
facilities. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy Service Companies, ENERGY.GOV,
http://energy.gov/eere/femp/energy-service-companies-0 [https://perma.cc/U5ANK7Z7]. Unlike other entities that offer energy efficiency improvements, such as
retrofits and risk management, ESCOs use performance-based contracting
methodology to implement its projects, thereby directly linking a company’s
compensation to actual energy cost savings. Id.
48. In New York for example, electric utilities are given a mostly exclusive
service territory in exchange for providing “just and reasonable” rates to
customers. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 61.2 (2016).
49. Federal Power Act § 217, 16 U.S.C. § 824q(a)(2)-(3) (2012).
50. Fitzsimmons, supra note 47.
51. Joshua M. Pearce & Paul J. Harris, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions
by Inducing Energy Conservation and Distributed Generation from Elimination
of Electric Utility Customer Charges, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 6514, 6514-15 (2007).
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schedules, known as tariffs, that dictate the price of electricity for
the particular type of customer.52 These tariffs reflect the
customer’s demand, while allowing the utility to make a
reasonable return on investment.53
While wholesale and retail energy markets engage in the
procurement, pricing, and sale of electricity as a fungible
commodity, capacity markets engage future investments for
energy demand.54 Capacity is “the capability of generation or other
resources to meet demand; the ability to produce energy, not the
energy itself.”55 Capacity is vital to the reliability of the electric
grid and the ability of LSEs to meet future projected demand.56
Every LSE on the grid must balance energy resources with load, or
demand, at all times to avoid an imbalance in the flow of electrons
throughout the grid.57 Such destabilization could result in power
outages for customers in the region, even those customers who
receive energy from a different LSE.58 Capacity ensures that the
electric utility or supplier has adequate resources to meet customer
demand plus a reserve amount to account for contingencies in the
grid.59 Suppliers can meet their capacity requirements with

52. BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 15, at 14.
53. Pearce & Harris, supra note 51, at 6524.
54. Capacity Market (RPM), PJM LEARNING CENTER, https://learn.pjm.com/
three-priorities/buying-and-selling-energy/capacity-markets.aspx
[https://perma.cc/GV75-QC9Q].
55. Jay Morrison, Capacity Markets: A Path Back to Resource Adequacy, 37
ENERGY L.J. 1, 4 n.5 (2016).
56. Capacity Markets, DIRECT ENERGY BUS., https://business.directenergy.
com/understanding-energy/managing-energy-costs/deregulation-and-energypricing/capacity-markets [https://perma.cc/E9AQ-HRGV].
57. Morrison, supra note 55, at 3.
58. Id.
59. Capacity Markets, supra note 56. Contingencies in the grid cause demand
to spike above historical levels, and can cause major losses in transmission or
generation resources with little to no notice to the grid operator. Morrison, supra
note 55, at 3-4. Contingencies include unplanned grid trips, or disconnects, of
large generators or transmissions lines that cause imbalances in the electric grid.
Id.; see, e.g., ERIC HIRST, PRICE-RESPONSIVE DEMAND AS RELIABILITY RESOURCES 4
(2002),
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/Hirst_PRDReliability_04-02.
pdf [https://perma.cc/AS8R-ZNA5]. Accordingly, the grid must have access to 920% more capacity than the anticipated peak demand, as based on historical
forecasts, to meet demand in the event of contingencies. Morrison, supra note 55
at 3-4.
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generation capacity they own, with capacity purchased from other
providers, or with capacity obtained through market auctions.60
Power generators are compensated for capacity, or the power
they will provide at some point in the future.61 RTOs and ISOs,
who manage capacity markets in their respective regions, pay
generators for their available capacity, independent of energy
costs.62 RTO and ISO payments come from the sale of capacity to
LSEs at auction.63 LSEs purchase the amount of capacity
necessary to meet the customer loads they serve within their
RTO/ISO region.64 In capacity auctions, “there is no functional
difference between a megawatt of power from a power plant and a
megawatt of reduced power from efficiency or demand response.”65
In other words, both energy resources (such as wind turbines, coalfired power plants, and other energy generators) and efficiency
resources (measures that reduce the amount of an energy resource
needed to meet demand) bid capacity into the market at the cost of
operation.66
Wholesale market operators (i.e. ISOs and RTOs) offer
demand response programs in both wholesale energy and capacity
markets.67 Likewise, FERC may institute demand response
policies applicable to all wholesale entities subject to its
jurisdiction.68 Utilities and other LSEs may also implement
demand response programs in retail markets, resulting in on-bill
reductions in the price of electricity for their customers.69 Demand
response programs function through ISO and RTO auctions.70 At
auction, aggregators of electricity customers and large-load

60. Capacity Markets, supra note 56.
61. Adam Jones, Opinion, Explainer: How Capacity Markets Work, MIDWEST
ENERGY NEWS (June 17, 2013), http://midwestenergynews.com/2013/06/17/expla
iner-how-capacity-markets-work [https://perma.cc/MRG8-FZTJ].
62. Capacity Markets, supra note 56.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Jones, supra note 61.
66. Id.
67. See BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 15, at 28.
68. Id. at 42.
69. See, e.g., Demand Response Program Options, PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO.,
http://www.pge.com/en/mybusiness/save/energymanagement/index.page?WT.mc
_id=Vanity_demandresponse [https://perma.cc/9XRG-PGGJ].
70. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 770 (2016).
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individual users submit bids to decrease electricity consumption by
a certain amount of MWs, at a set price, for a set period of time.71
Wholesale market operators treat these demand response bids like
supply offers from generators.72 Operators then rank all the bids
received from the least to most expensive in what is referred to as
a “bid stack.”73 Winning bids receive the wholesale market price
for their contributions, which is equivalent to the Locational
Marginal Price (“LMP”). In economic principles, the LMP
represents the added cost of meeting another unit of demand,
which is the price an efficient market would produce.74
Bids for efficiency resources in the capacity market, like
demand response, have the ability to lower the market clearing
price and displace more costly generators.75 For instance, a
generator bidding 100 megawatts (“MW”) of demand response into
the capacity market at $150 per MW asserts that, for the future
period of time covered by the auction, it will curtail 100 MW of
demand rather than generating 100 MW to meet demand.76 If the
100 MW of demand response, when added to the bid stack, is
enough to meet regional demand, the market clearing price is set
at $150 per MW, as no other resources would be needed to serve
forecasted load. If a peaking coal-fired power plant had bid 100 MW
into the market $160 per MW, the demand response bid would
displace the coal generator. All resources that bid in under $150

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Market Equilibrium, ECONS. ONLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/
Competitive_markets/Market_equilibrium.html [https://perma.cc/5J7R-C58U].
Efficient markets tend towards equilibrium. In wholesale electricity markets,
when supply is balanced with demand in equipoise, the market is thought to have
achieved economic equilibrium. Market Equilibrium, supra note 74. The market
designates the price point at which supply equals demand, which varies on a
regional basis, depending on the locational need of LSEs. Id.; see EPSA, 136 S. Ct.
at 768-69.
75. Market Equilibrium, supra note 74. The clearing price is the price needed
to “clear the market.” In other words, the price all resources who bid into the
market receive for their capacity commitments. Id. The price is set by the most
expensive generator needed to meet demand. Id. When efficiency is bid into the
market, less energy is needed to meet peak demand, reducing the amount of
energy needed from costlier peaking generators, like coal plants, that often come
in at the top of the bid stack. Id.
76. Id.
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per MW clearing price would receive $150 per MW, even if, for
example, a wind turbine bid into the market at $100 per MW.77
Prior to FERC v. EPSA, the division between wholesale and
retail markets, and state and federal jurisdiction, was not clear in
application to the country’s interconnected electric grid. Market
regulation invited challenges to the scope and breadth of state and
federal jurisdiction, and raised complications in the realm of
cooperative federalism.78 Post-FERC v. EPSA, implementing the
Supreme Court’s holding in real time energy markets may be a
more challenging task than wading through the Federal Power Act
on paper. In fact, the Supreme Court’s decision did not exactly
clear the jurisdictional confusion. Retail markets strongly
influence wholesale markets, and FERC jurisdiction over
wholesale markets affects the sale of energy at retail levels.79 To
prevent circumscribing states’ rights, the Court left one imperative
question unanswered: whether demand response providers—in
states that even have demand response programs to begin with –
may sell only to retail utilities or may also (or instead) sell into
wholesale markets.80
III. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT AND STATUTORY
AUTHORITY
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that
the Commerce Clause bars states from regulating “certain
interstate electricity transactions, including wholesale sales (i.e.
sales for resale) across state lines.”81 The ruling created a
jurisdictional gap, referred to as the “Attleboro gap,” that could
only be filled with legislation.82 Congress responded by passing the
Federal Power Act in 1935.83 The Federal Power Act (“FPA”)
confers jurisdiction on FERC to regulate wholesale electricity

77. Id. For additional examples of how capacity auctions function generally,
see image entitled “How a Capacity Auction Works.” Jones, supra note 61.
78. See EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 770.
79. See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, supra note 30, at 35.
80. Hempling, supra note 29.
81. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767 (quoting Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro
Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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markets and reserves jurisdiction over all other electricity sales
(i.e. retail sales) to states.84 Specifically, the FPA charged FERC’s
predecessor agency with instituting “effective federal regulation of
the expanding business of transmitting and selling electric power
in interstate commerce.”85 Accordingly, FERC must oversee all
prices associated with interstate transactions, as well as “all rules
and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges,”
which must be “just and reasonable.”86 If any rate, charge, rule or
regulation “affecting such rate [or] charge” fails to meet that
standard, FERC must determine what is “just and reasonable” and
“impose the same by order.”87
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 declares it the policy of the
United States that “demand response be encouraged,” and
mandates that unnecessary barriers to demand response
participation in energy markets be eliminated.88 To comply with
this requirement, FERC issued rules to facilitate participation of
demand-response providers in wholesale markets.89 FERC Order
888, for instance, required wholesale market operators to permit
retail electricity aggregators to bid demand response commitments
directly into the wholesale market.90 When FERC passed the final
rule, no party sought judicial review of the rulemaking.91
Under the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act,
Congress instructed FERC to develop a national plan for demand

84. Brief for the Petitioner at 3-4, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S.
Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840).
85. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767 (quoting New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002)).
86. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012)).
87. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012)).
88. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 84, at 9; see EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 770
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 2642 (2005)).
89. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 84, at 11.
90. Non-Discriminatory Open Access Transmission Tariff, 18 C.F.R. § 35.28
(2016) (commonly known as FERC Order 888). See also FERC Transmission
Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public
Utilities Rule, 18 C.F.R. § 35 (2016) (commonly known as FERC Order 1000). Both
FERC Orders 888 and 1000 govern aspects of transmission that may have a
relevant impact on federal demand response programs.
91. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 84, at 11.
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response.92 FERC responded with rulemaking Order No. 745.93
The rule amends prior FERC regulations mandated under the FPA
to regulate demand response.94 FERC invoked its authority to
amend its regulations under the FPA provision that mandates
FERC change “any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting
such rate, change, or classification” that is “unjust, unreasonable,
unduly discriminatory, or preferential.”95 The D.C. Circuit vacated
Order No. 745 in its entirety on the grounds that FERC
overstepped its jurisdiction into the realm of state control.96 The
court also found the rule’s compensation scheme to be arbitrary
and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).97
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the D.C. Circuit
Court to address a question left unanswered in its initial
decision.98
A. FERC Order 745
In March 2011, FERC issued rulemaking Order 745,
commonly referred to as the Demand Response Rule.99 The rule
regulates demand response in organized wholesale energy markets
by establishing the price paid for demand response.100 The rule
92. Id. at 9.
93. See Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy
Markets, Order No. 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (March 15, 2011) [hereinafter FERC
Order 745].
94. Id. For instance, FERC Order 719 required wholesale market operators
to receive demand response bids from aggregators of electricity customers except
where state retail authority barred participation in the market. FERC v. Elec.
Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 771 (2016).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012); see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 84, at 14.
96. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 763.
97. Id. In finding FERC’s compensation scheme to be arbitrary and
capricious, the D.C. Circuit arrived at an alternate holding that did not address
the jurisdictional question. Recent Case, Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC:
D.C. Circuit Rules that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Lacks
Jurisdiction over Rates for Nonconsumption of Energy, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1518,
1524 (2015).
98. David T. Doot et. al., What’s Next? Potential Impact of the Landmark
Supreme Court Decision in FERC v. EPSA on Demand Response Across the
Country, DAY PITNEY LLP (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.daypitney.com/insights/
publications/2016/02/09-whats-next-potential-impact-of-ferc [https://perma.cc/4Y
UG-W8MK].
99. See FERC Order 745, supra note 93.
100. Id.
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applies to RTOs or ISOs who conduct competitive auctions to set
the wholesale price of electricity.101 When an RTO or ISO has the
option of engaging in demand response by balancing supply and
demand, rather than dispatching additional generation, the rule
requires that demand response providers receive the same
compensation for conserving energy as generators would for
producing energy.102
The rule is premised on the notion that a bid to provide
electricity provides the same value to the wholesale market as a
bid to generate more electricity, because each cost-effectively
balances supply and demand.103 To ensure demand response and
supply bids provide the same value, the rule requires that demand
response bids must meet two conditions: first, “a demand response
bidder must have the capability to provide the service offered; it
must, that is, actually be able to reduce electricity use and thereby
obviate the operator’s need to secure additional power.”104 Second,
“paying LMP for a demand response bid must be cost effective, as
measured by. . . the net-benefits test.”105 In exercising its
rulemaking authority, FERC reasoned that the FPA grants
jurisdiction over such bids because they “directly affect wholesale
rates.”106 Likewise, the rule’s approach for compensating
customers for engaging in demand response “helps to ensure the
competitiveness of the organized wholesale energy markets and
remove[s] market barriers to the participation of demand response
resources, thus ensuring just and reasonable rates” in accordance
with statutory mandate.107

101. Id.
102. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016).
103. Id. at 771.
104. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
105. See id. at 771 (internal quotation marks omitted); FERC Order 745,
supra note 93 at 1. The net-benefits test “makes certain that accepting a lowerpriced demand response bid over a higher-priced supply bid will actually save
LSEs (i.e., wholesale purchasers) money.” EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 771.
106. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 772 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2012)).
107. FERC Order 745, supra note 93, at 1.
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IV. DEMAND RESPONSE PRECEDENT
A. FERC v. EPSA
The Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”) brought the
initial challenge to Order 745 in 2013.108 Electricity generation
organizations, demand response providers, grid operators, and
large corporations joined EPSA’s action, arguing FERC did not
have authority under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) to “regulate
the rules used by operators of wholesale electricity markets to pay
for reductions in electricity consumption and to recoup those
payments through adjustments to wholesale rates.”109 In its brief
on appeal to the Supreme Court, the EPSA argued that “FERC has
no more jurisdiction to regulate retail-level ‘demand response’
through payments to retail customers than it does to raise retail
prices directly.”110 The challenge sparked debate over the extent to
which federal and state regulators can or cannot allow demand—
that is, anything on the customer side of the electric meter—to
participate in grid affairs.111
The D.C. Circuit ruled that the FPA bars FERC from directly
regulating any matter under state control, including the retail
energy market.112 The three-judge panel reasoned that demand
response, while not necessarily a retail sale, is part of the retail
market, exclusively within the jurisdiction of the states.113 Given
longstanding precedent in the realm of agency rulemaking, FERC
argued on appeal that the D.C. Circuit misinterpreted the FPA,
and misapplied basic principles of agency deference under
Chevron.114 According to the Solicitor General, who filed the
108. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
109. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 95, at I.
110. Walton, supra note 22.
111. Robert Walton, EPSA Urges Supreme Court Not to Reconsider FERC
Order 745 Invalidation, UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.
com/news/epsa-urges-supreme-court-not-to-reconsider-ferc-order-745invalidation/377342 [https://perma.cc/SS49-3ALQ].
112. Katherine Tweed, Supreme Court Will Hear FERC Order 745 Demand
Response Case, GREENTECH MEDIA, (May 4, 2015), http://www.greentechmedia.
com/articles/read/supreme-court-will-hear-ferc-order-745-demand-response-case
[https://perma.cc/6XCD-QH4Q].
113. Id.
114. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 95; Jeff St. John, The Future of
Demand Response: How a Legal Challenge Could Dramatically Change the
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Supreme Court challenge on behalf of FERC, the Court of Appeals
“departed from the interpretive approach to the FPA that the court
has applied for a half-century;” that is, to give FERC flexibility in
performing its mandate of ensuring just and reasonable wholesale
electricity rates.115
The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether
FERC has the authority to regulate the rules by which operators
of wholesale-electricity markets pay for reductions in electricity
consumption and recoup those payments through adjustments in
wholesale rates;116 and (2) even if FERC has requisite statutory
jurisdiction, did the agency adequately justify why “demand
response providers and electricity producers should receive the
same compensation?”117
The Supreme Court answered both questions affirmatively,
upholding FERC’s Order 745. Writing for the majority, Justice
Kagan outlined three holdings: First, FERC has authority to
require wholesale electric market operators to pay the same price
to demand response providers for conserving energy as generators
for producing it, so long as customers actually save money.118
Under the FPA, FERC’s regulatory jurisdiction is confined to these
Industry, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/
articles/featured/ferc-order-745-the-supreme-court-and-the-future-of-demandresponse [https://perma.cc/9PRA-RKMM]; see also Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“If the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”). “A permissible
construction is one that is not ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
statute.’” David Kemp, Chevron Deference: Your Guide to Understanding Two of
Today’s SCOTUS Decisions, JUSTIA L. BLOG (May 21, 2012), https://
lawblog.justia.com/2012/05/21/chevron-deference-your-guide-to-understandingtwo-of-todays-scotus-decisions [https://perma.cc/QY3A-4FDV]. If the agency’s
construction is permissible, the agency’s interpretation is given deference (so
called Chevron deference). Id. The Government’s alternative argument on appeal
to the Supreme Court was that FERC’s interpretation of the Federal Power Act
was entitled to deference under Chevron. See FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,
136 S. Ct. 760, 773 n.5 (2016). Because the Court found FERC had clear authority
to act under the statute, it did not address the issue of Chevron deference. Id. at
785.
115. St. John, supra note 114.
116. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767. The Supreme Court articulated the first issue
as whether “the FPA permits FERC to regulate these demand response
transactions at all, or does any such rule impinge States’ authority?” Id.
117. Id.; Hempling, supra note 29.
118. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 760; see Hempling, supra note 29.
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practices, and thus, Order 745 falls squarely within FERC’s
wholesale domain.119 Second, although wholesale market
transactions affect retail rates, FERC’s regulatory plan did not
invade states’ authority to regulate retail rates.120 Finally, FERC’s
compensation scheme of paying demand response providers at the
LMP also paid to generators was not arbitrary and capricious
under the Administrative Procedure Act.121
The issues required the Court to interpret the FPA in the
context of the interconnected electricity grid. Justice Kagan noted
the challenge at hand, “in point of fact, if not of law – the wholesale
and retail markets in electricity are inextricably linked.”122
Adopting a “common sense construction of the FPA’s language,
limiting FERC’s ‘affecting’ jurisdiction to rules or practices that
‘directly affect the [wholesale] rate’,” the Court reasoned that
regulating wholesale demand response was wholly within FERC’s
jurisdiction.123 Demand response “directly affects” wholesale rates
because, if rewarded at the LMP, as opposed to some lower price,
more demand response providers will submit bids capable of
displacing generation, in turn lowering wholesale electricity
prices.124 Additionally, increased market participation by demand
response providers places “downward pressure” on bids from
generators, thereby encouraging power plants to offer electricity at
lower prices, lest they risk losing out at auction.125 This too lowers
rates for wholesale power purchasers, linking compensation for
demand response directly to wholesale market prices.126
Accordingly, FERC’s regulation did not violate the FPA by
overstepping into the realm of state jurisdiction, “just because it
affects – even substantially – the quantity or terms of retail
sales.”127 In fact, the Court has long held that FERC may regulate
matters beyond the wholesale market so long as States’ retail rate-

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 760.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 774-75.
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774-75.
Id.
Id. at 776.
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setting authority is not infringed.128 In regulating demand
response, FERC did no more than address transactions occurring
in the wholesale market:
Wholesale market operators administer the entire program,
receiving every energy demand response bid made. Those
operators accept such bid at the mandated price when (and only
when) the bid provides value to the wholesale energy market by
balancing supply and demand more “cost effectively” – i.e. at a
lower cost to wholesale purchasers – than a bid to generate power.
The compensation paid for a successful bid [Locational Marginal
Price] (LMP) is whatever the operator’s auction has determined is
the marginal price of wholesale electricity at a particular location
and time. And those footing the bill are the same wholesale
purchasers that have benefited from the lower wholesale price
demand response participation has produced. In sum, whatever
the effects at the retail level, every aspect of the regulatory plan
happens exclusively on the wholesale market and governs
exclusively that market’s rules.129

EPSA argued to the contrary, claiming FERC usurped state
power because the rule “effectively, even though not nominally
regulates retail prices.”130 Nevertheless, EPSA conceded that

128. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ind., 332
U.S. 507, 516 (1947) (holding the same); see also Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss.
ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 365, 370-73 (1988) (holding an order regulating
wholesale purchases was within FERC’s jurisdiction and preempted state action
despite clearly affecting retail prices); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thomburg,
476 U.S. 953, 959-61 (1986) (holding the same).
129. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776. While acknowledging that FERC’s statutory
authority extends to “some surprising places,” the Court rejected the implications
laid out by the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 774. In attempting to analogize the impact of
wholesale demand response on retail rates, the D.C. Circuit drew conclusions
beyond the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction: “markets in all electricity’s inputs – steel,
fuel, and labor most prominent among them – might affect generator’s supply of
power. . .and for that matter, markets in just about everything – the whole
economy, as it were – might influence LSE’s demand.” Id. The Supreme Court
tersely stated otherwise: Congress never intended for the FPA to grant such
expansive jurisdiction. While wholesale level demand response does influence
LSE’s demand, FERC’s rules governing wholesale demand response programs,
unlike the D.C. Circuit’s hypothetical, meet the FPA’s standard of “directly
affecting wholesale electricity rates.” Id. at 784 (emphasis added). Any extension
to steel, fuel, or labor markets is too attenuated to fall within the FPA’s
jurisdictional sphere. Id.
130. Id. at 777.
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FERC’s rule did not set actual rates.131 Rather, states can continue
to make or approve retail rates, and in designing those rates, may
insulate customers from price fluctuations in the market.132 The
Court looked to the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “rate” in
reaching its holding. “Rate,” according to Black’s, is “an amount
paid or charged for a good or service.”133 Accordingly, the act of
setting retail rates is to “establish the amount of money a consumer
will hand over in exchange for power.”134 FERC does not set retail
electric rates simply by altering the incentive to purchase that
product.135 The Court dispelled the ESPA’s argument by refusing
to redefine “rate” as the price paid for electricity plus the
opportunity cost of foregoing other alternatives.136
As its third and final holding, the Court found FERC’s
compensation scheme was not arbitrary or capricious under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Order 745 attempts to
ensure “just and reasonable” wholesale rates, as per FERC’s FPA
mandate, by requiring market operators to compensate demand
response providers in order to bring about “meaningful demandside participation” in the wholesale market.137 Upon meeting two
conditions, market operators must pay the LMP for any accepted
demand response bid as they would for any successful supply bids.
In other words, demand response providers would receive the same
payment for conserving electricity as generators would for
producing it.138
The two-condition contingency ensures that FERC satisfies its
statutory mandate in regulating practices that directly affect
wholesale rates:
First, a demand response bidder must have the “capability to
provide the service” offered; it must, that is, actually be able to
reduce electricity use and thereby obviate the operator’s need to
secure additional power. Second, paying the LMP for a demand

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 777.
Id. (quoting Rate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 777.
Id.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 771.
Id.
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response bid “must be cost effective,” as measured by the netbenefits test. That test makes certain that accepting a lower-priced
demand response big over a higher-priced supply bid will actually
save LSEs (i.e. wholesale purchasers) money.139

The EPSA challenged FERC’s compensation scheme on the
grounds of misplaced economic theory, arguing that paying the
LMP would overcompensate demand response providers.140 Under
the EPSA’s view, the LMP includes a retail rate that reflects the
costs a generator incurs and the benefits it obtains in the
process.141 In reaching the LMP value, FERC found such
considerations to be irrelevant: “paying LMP to all generators –
although some would then walk away with more profit and some
with less – ‘encourages more efficient supply and demand
decisions’. . .and [there is] no economic reason to treat demand
response providers differently.”142 FERC went to great lengths to
explain why rewarding demand response providers at the LMP
encourages competition and in turn, lowers wholesale prices.143
Despite the EPSA’s urging, the Court declined to read the
“FPA, against its clear terms, to halt a practice that so evidently
enables [FERC] to fulfill its statutory duties of holding down prices
and enabling market reliability in the wholesale energy
market.”144 In reviewing FERC’s compensation scheme, the Court,
under the APA’s standard, refused to substitute its judgment for
FERC’s expertise.145 The scope of the arbitrary and capricious
standard is narrow – the court must uphold an agency’s
rulemaking if the agency has “examined the relevant
considerations and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its
action, including a rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made.”146 The Court affords great deference to FERC’s
rate decisions upon a detailed explanation of its choice of the LMP

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 782.
Id.
Id. at 783 (citation omitted).
Id. at 783.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 782
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 782 (citation omitted).
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pricing scheme over the opponent’s preferred LMP – G scheme.147
Ultimately, FERC engaged in reasoned decision making, weighed
competing views, and intelligibly explained its compensation
decision, well within the bounds of its agency expertise.148
B. Post FERC v. EPSA
The Supreme Court’s decision makes clear that states may
take some ownership of retail-level demand response, and leaves
states with at least three definitive options.149 First, states can
decide whether customers may even sell demand response to begin
with.150 This option is pertinent to states that do not currently
have demand response programs.151 Second, states can decide
what companies can sell into the wholesale market, if at all.152
Third, states can decide whether demand response, once
aggregated by permitted companies, will be used to reduce local
utility load (retail demand response) or will be sold directly into
the wholesale market (wholesale demand response).153
Accordingly, states have enormous discretion to implement the
Court’s holding – their degree of power ranges from excluding
demand response programs from their state altogether to
determining whether demand response will be used in the retail or
wholesale energy market. The wholesale market will continue
exploring alternative rules to manage demand-side resources.154
Some ISOs have already prepared plans to allow demand response
to continue in other demand-side markets.155 The balance between
state and federal control in electricity markets arising out of the
Court’s decision has lead energy regulatory experts to call FERC

147. Id. at 782. The “G” value represents the retail cost and benefits, or the
opportunity costs of foregoing generation. Id.
148. Id. at 784.
149. Id.
150. Hempling, supra note 29.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Davide Savenije, ICYMI: What To Expect When Demand Response Goes
Before the Supreme Court, UTILITY DIVE (May 6, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.
com/news/icymi-what-to-expect-when-demand-response-goes-before-thesupreme-court/394575/ [https://perma.cc/BX2J-8XQL].
155. Id.
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v. EPSA a landmark decision for the future of energy law and
policy.156
New York agencies’ challenge to the NYISO’s Buyer-Side
Mitigation (“BSM”) rule provides a case study into the
jurisdictional aftermath of EPSA and sheds light on the challenges
states are already facing in implementing the Court’s ruling.157
New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision (“REV”) proceeding and
California’s Independent System Operator’s (“CAISO”) Distributed
Energy Resource Provider (“DERP”) Program are two examples of
state-level market reforms that take advantage of demand
response. These kinds of state retail-level demand response
mechanisms are likely to take center stage. CAISO’s DERP has so
far been successful at achieving electricity cost savings, and New
York’s REV proceeding aims to achieve similar savings with
alternative market mechanisms.158 Regardless of how individual
states implement the Supreme Court’s ruling, they will play an
integral role in forthcoming demand response mechanisms, filling
the gaps where FERC’s jurisdiction does not reach.
C. Top-Down v. Bottom-Up Regulatory Approaches
The California Independent System Operator’s (“CAISO”)
Distributed Energy Resource Provider (“DERP”) Program may
serve as a model for states aiming to expand retail-level demand
response.159 The DERP is a top-down regulatory approach, in that
it is designed and administered by the ISO, and applies to electric
156. Walton, supra note 22.
157. See generally Complaint, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n et al. v. N.Y.
Indep. Sys. Operator, 153 FERC ¶ 61,022 (June 25, 2016) (No. EL 16-92-000).
“New York agencies” includes the New York State Public Service Commission,
New York Power Authority, Long Island Power Authority, New York State
Energy Research and Development Authority, and the City of New York. Id.
Advanced Energy Management Alliance and the Natural Resources Defense
Council joined the New York agencies, who collectively comprise the
“complainants” in the BSM challenge. Id.
158. See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATORS, ENERGY STORAGE AND AGGREGATED
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY EDUCATION FORUM 43 (2015), http://www.caiso.com/
Documents/Presentation-EnergyStorageandAggregatedDistributedEnergy
Resource-EducationalForum.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN7S-QMXF4].
159. See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATORS, EXPANDED METERING AND TELEMETRY
OPTION PHASE 2 (2015), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/DraftFinalProposal_
ExpandedMetering_TelemetryOptionsPhase2_DistributedEnergyResourceProvi
der.pdf [https://perma.cc/C386-DL6S].
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utilities.160 Under the rule, electric service companies and utilities
can purchase and consolidate energy outputs from distributed
energy resources into a bundle of resources that can then be sold
into the ISO electricity market.161 Distributed Energy Resource
Providers are analogous to demand response providers in current
ISO markets, and thus, the CAISO reasoned that demand response
is a category of distributed energy resources that may be
aggregated and sold into the wholesale market.162 Essentially, the
ISO did with the DERP what the Supreme Court allowed FERC to
do under Order 745. With the DERP, utilities may sell demand
response from the retail-level distributed energy resources into the
wholesale market.163 FERC Order 745 allows aggregated retail
customers, especially those owning or utilizing distributed energy
resources, to sell demand response into the wholesale market.164
New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision (“REV”)
proceeding, on the other hand, constitutes “bottom-up” reform.165
The Public Service Commission (“PSC”) initiated REV, which
works up from the PSC to the ISO level.166 REV aims to expand
and integrate distributed energy resources into the state’s energy
profile.167 While both the CAISO proposal and REV have the
integration of distributed energy resources in mind, REV seeks to
move distributed energy resources from alternative resources to
the source of core generation in investor-owned utility business
models.168 REV also differs in that participating distributed energy
resource providers may sell distributed energy resource outputs

160. Id. at 5.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 4.
163. Id. at 5.
164. FERC Order 745, supra note 93, at 1.
165. Reforming the Energy Vision, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV.,
http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/CC4F2EFA3A23551585257DEA007
DCFE2? [https://perma.cc/C2YX-TDEL]. The REV proceeding is “bottom-up” in
that utilities, the entities closest to retail consumers, administer demand
response. This is contrasted with California’s DERP “top-down” proceeding
whereby ISOs, the regional entities closest to FERC (and thus farthest from retail
customers) administers demand response. Under various tenants of New York’s
REV initiative, demand response has been implemented in both the wholesale
and retail markets. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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into the retail market, as opposed to the ISO market proposed by
the CAISO.169
The CAISO’s DERP and New York’s REV proceeding are
expected to act as models for ISOs, utilities, and state regulatory
agencies to adopt market mechanisms for implementing demand
response from retail customers into the wholesale market.170
States can use these model programs as case studies for designing
regulatory market mechanisms that take full advantage of demand
response’s potential environmental benefits. While both the DERP
and REV have environmental goals in mind, numerous other
regulatory mechanisms exist to address climate change and
mitigate environmental damages through the utilization of
demand response.
D. Case Study: New York Buyer-Side Mitigation Rule
Challenge
In March 2008, FERC directed the NYISO to implement
buyer-side mitigation (“BSM”) measures in its installed capacity
market (“ICAP market”).171 Price signals in the ICAP market
“indicate[ ] when sufficient capacity is available or when additional
ICAP resources are needed to meet New York’s peak demand and
maintain its planning reserve margin.”172 To prevent artificial
suppression of capacity market prices, the NYISO instituted two
capacity market mitigation measures: first, Offer Cap mitigation
in the form of a maximum offer price intended to prevent suppliers
from raising prices above competitive levels, and second, Offer
Floor mitigation in the form of a minimum offer price aimed at
preventing the suppression of prices below competitive levels.173
The NYISO instituted the mandatory measures in the form of tariff
provisions that limited the participation of certain demand

169. Id.
170. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming
the Energy Vision, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., http://documents.dps.ny.gov/
public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx?MatterCaseNo=14-m-0101
[https://perma.cc/4XJ3-247J].
171. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 122 FERC ¶ 61,211, 62,191 (Mar. 7,
2008).
172. Complaint at 9-10, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n et al. v. N.Y. Indep.
Sys. Operator, 153 FERC ¶ 61,022 (May 8, 2015) (No. EL 15-64-000).
173. Id. at 16.
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response providers, or Special Case Resources (“SCR”), in the ICAP
market.174 The mandatory measures provide that “unless exempt
from [market] mitigation, new capacity resources must enter
[mitigated capacity zone ICAP] markets . . . at a price at or above
the . . . offer floor and continue to meet the offer floor until their
capacity clears twelve month auctions.”175 Under the BSM rules,
the NYISO must evaluate every resource in a mitigated zone to
determine if it should receive an exemption from the capacity offer
floor or cap measures.176 If an SCR is ineligible for an exemption,
it is subject to mitigation and may be unable to earn capacity
market revenues if the clearing price at auction is below the SCR’s
minimum bid, or offer floor.177
In May 2015, the New York PSC, the New York Power
Authority (“NYPA”), and the New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority (“NYSERDA”) (collectively, the “Parties”)
filed a complaint against the NYISO arguing, inter alia, that the
BSM rules should not apply to renewable energy resources, nuclear
resources, SCRs, and demand response resources.178 In regards to
demand response, the Parties advocated that including state-level
demand programs into the SCR Offer Floor calculation would
likely deter demand response from participating in utility demand
response programs to avoid mitigation in capacity markets.179 The
Parties asserted that the BSM rules would have the effect of
“interfering with the State’s distribution-level [d]emand [r]esponse
programs . . . [and] impermissibly intrud[ing] upon reliability and
distribution planning matters reserved to the states under the
Federal Power Act,” a similar argument advanced by the EPSA
before the Supreme Court.180 Relatedly, Parties asserted that the
BSM rules interfere with the State’s ability to use demand

174. Morrison, supra note 55, at 14.
175. Id. (citation omitted).
176. Complaint, supra note 172, at 11.
177. Id. at 18.
178. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n et al. v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, 153
FERC ¶ 61,022 (Oct. 9, 2015) (No. EL 15-64-000). The Parties made additional
arguments as to the application of the BSM measures that are not within the
scope of this note’s discussion. The Parties were joined in November 2015 by the
City of New York, Multiple Intervenors, and the Natural Resources Defense
Council in seeking a rehearing of FERC’s BSM Exemption Order.
179. Complaint, supra note 157, at 3.
180. Id.
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response as a system tool to lower retail rates.181 In effect, the
Parties argued NYISO’s BSM rules constituted impermissible
overreaching into state jurisdictional territory under the FPA by
erecting barriers to entry into the state’s demand response
programs.182
By interfering in state-level demand response, the Parties
argued that the NYISO interfered with legitimate state policy
objectives that obligate the PSC to consider environmental policy
when setting utility distribution rates and regulations.183 New
York’s 2015 State Energy Plan instituted REV and outlined the
state’s policy of “removing market barriers and bridging market
gaps to transition New York to a clean energy economy that will
produce economic growth and preserve the state’s environment by
reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases and other
pollutants.”184 Additionally, the Energy Plan instructed that
mechanisms that reduce or shift peak demand, such as demand
response, should be “seriously considered, whenever practical.”185
In so inducing SCRs to choose between participating in retail,
distribution-level demand response participation or NYISOadministered demand response, the BSM rules effectively limited
the state’s ability to achieve its environmental targets, particularly
due to the fact that both wholesale and retail demand response are
necessary to achieve wide-spread environmental benefits.
Wholesale and retail demand response are “intended to address
different systems, yield distinct benefits, and compensate for
different services provided.”186 The Parties called out the
cooperative federalism argument espoused by the Supreme Court,
and in response to Parties’ complaint, the NYISO agreed. In its
answer, the NYISO recognized the indirect effect BSM rules would
have on demand response participation, erecting a barrier to entry
in the market, and halting the state’s ability to meet its REV, and
state energy policy goals.187

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 37 (citing N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 3-0101(1) (2016)).
184. Id. at 38 (citation omitted).
185. Complaint, supra note 157, at 39.
186. Id. at 42.
187. Answer at 2, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n et al. v. N.Y. Indep. Sys.
Operator, 153 FERC ¶ 61,022 (No. EL 16-92-000) (Aug. 2016).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4

28

2016]

DUAL ENVIRONMENTALISM

193

In effect, the Parties’ challenge of the NYISO’s market rules
was a direct application of the EPSA decision. FERC, and the
entities subject to its jurisdiction, may regulate the wholesale
market but must not interfere in retail rate-setting. As opposed to
Order 745’s demand response rules deemed legitimate by the
Supreme Court, the NYISO’s BSM rules (wholesale capacity
market rules) interfered with the state’s ability to set just and
reasonable retail rates through the use of distribution-level (retail
market) demand response, in contravention of the FPA and the
Supreme Court’s EPSA holding. The arguments espoused by
Parties represent the challenges states may face in implementing
the Court’s ruling. This challenge presents a case study into states’
abilities to advocate for large-scale environmental benefits through
the use of both wholesale and retail demand response.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DEMAND
RESPONSE
By shaping consumer preferences for energy resources and
shifting consumption to lower-demand periods, demand response
has great potential to lessen the environmental externality costs of
generating electricity. While promoting more renewable energy
resources and strategically shifting demand has been shown to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the local level, little is known
of the full environmental benefits of demand response.188 Thus, an
environmental regulatory scheme aimed at combating climate
change should incorporate some form of demand response in both
retail and wholesale energy markets. A brief analysis of demand
response studies is necessary to understand the full beneficial
potential of incorporating demand response into an environmental
regulatory scheme.
Demand response studies have revealed the energy
conservation potential of strategic demand curtailment. When
customers see the impact of demand response on their monthly
electric bills, over time, they may adopt further conservation habits
that, when combined with other demand-side energy-saving
strategies, have quantifiable environmental benefits. However,
“one of the most important yet inadequately investigated elements

188. See Nemtzow et al., supra note 13, at 43.
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of [demand response] is its impact on the environment. There are
numerous reasons to expect a positive environmental impact . . .
but the results will always be very system- and generation-fleet
specific.”189
Perhaps the primary “environmental” characteristic of
demand response is its ability to shape individual consumer
behavior towards more energy efficient electricity consumption by
animating wholesale and capacity market forces.190 The extent to
which demand response can shape consumption is ultimately
dependent on the energy resources used to produce the grid’s
electricity supply (the generation fleet).191 For instance,
implementing demand response in a grid system where gas
generators supply baseload and diesel fuel generators supply peak
load will produce different environmental impacts than demand
response mechanisms in a grid mix containing coal baseload
generators and hydro-electric peaking generators.192 Given the
variety of energy fuels used to generate electricity across the
United States, the environmental benefits accruing from demand
response are dependent on what fuel sources are used, how close
generation is located to the point of consumption, the consumption
patterns of end users – including residential, commercial, and
industrial consumers – and the regulatory reach of the entities who
participate in and/or administer the demand response program.193
While the environmental impacts associated with demand
response are partially dependent on the energy fuel used to
produce electricity, the converse is also true – demand response
can encourage the use of particular energy fuels (i.e. natural gas,
solar, wind, etc.) to generate electricity.194 Namely, demand
response can encourage implementation of renewable energy
resources into the grid’s mix of electricity.195 The very nature of
demand response – cutting consumption to decrease demand on
the system – facilitates the use of intermittent generation, for
instance, sources such as wind and solar, that cannot be generated
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 43.
See generally id.
Nemtzow et al., supra note 13, at 43.
See generally id.
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when the wind is not blowing or when the sun is not shining.196 In
addition to using demand response to cut consumption during peak
demand periods, it can also be used to balance load as intermittent
energy sources power up and come on line.197 Load balancing, the
practice of storing power during low demand periods to meet
increasing demand, may alleviate the intermittency downfalls of
renewable energy resources, thereby making renewable energy a
more viable, dependable supply of energy.198 In this way, and in
combination with certain new technologies, demand response is an
important support infrastructure for developing renewable energy
resources.199
The environmental benefits of demand response go much
farther than simply shifting and cutting energy consumption. In
fact, studies aimed at exploring the location-based environmental
benefits of demand response suggest that demand response can
mitigate the effects of climate change through the reduction of
carbon, nitrous oxide, and sulfur dioxide emissions.200 Shifting
generation from peak to off-peak periods also shifts emissions from
energy generation and consumption to off-peak periods.201 Offpeak periods include nighttime, when less electricity is needed in
homes, businesses, and industrial processes, and spring and fall,
when air conditioning and heating are not used to the extent they
are needed in the summer and winter.202 Greenhouse gases like
nitrous oxide, sulfur dioxide, and particulates can be altered and
exacerbated by the presence of sunlight and high temperatures.203
Mixed with sunlight, these greenhouse gas emissions form ground196. Id. at 44.
197. Id.
198. See Lauren Sommer, A (Load) Balancing Act: The Challenge of Clean
Power, NPR (Aug. 18, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=129253742 [https://perma.cc/AN66-SPA6].
199. Nemtzow et al., supra note 13, at 45.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 44.
202. Time of Use Hours & Pricing, PAC. POWER, https://www.pacificpower.
net/ya/po/otou/ooh.html [https://perma.cc/XB4Y-FLL2].
203. Causes of Climate Change, EPA, http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/
science/causes.html [https://perma.cc/54P5-2TR5]. Greenhouse gases released
overnight are nevertheless affected by rising temperatures and sunlight the
following day; however, by shifting daytime energy use to off-peak periods, less
greenhouse gases are emitted during these high temperature/sunlight periods,
mitigating some climate change effects. See generally id.
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level ozone and smog.204 Thus, shifting electricity consumption to
off-peak periods can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by
alleviating the formation of ozone and smog.205 Because of demand
responses’ potential to drastically mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions in this way, the Ozone Transport Commission and state
environmental agencies have begun to explore the use of demand
response as a method for achieving ambient air quality standards
in non-attainment areas regulated under the Clean Air Act.206
Though the emissions-mitigation and renewable energy
implementation benefits of demand response have wide-reaching
impacts on global climate change, most environmental benefits
from demand response occur at the local level.207 In a 2003 study
modeling the impact of demand response on air emissions in New
England, Synapse Energy Economics (“Synapse”) noted resulting
regional emissions reductions.208 The study examined large,
established demand response programs, and included models for
distributed generation.209 Because demand response functions to
shift electricity consumption to off-peak periods, the study found
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions to be most significant in
summer months.210 Synapse noted significant reductions in
204. Nemtzow et al., supra note 13, at 44.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. Distributed generation is defined as “renewable energy sited at or
close to where its energy is consumed.” THOMAS BOURGEOIS ET AL., PACE ENERGY
& CLIMATE CTR., COMMUNITY MICROGRIDS: SMARTER, CLEANER, GREENER 3 (2013),
http://energy.pace.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Community%20Microgrids
%20Report%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/LHP3-NP25]. Distributed generation can
take the form of solar photovoltaics, solar thermal, wind, hydro, geothermal, or
biomass, as well as combined heat and power technologies. Id. at 2. Distributed
generation allows electricity to be produced closer to the source of consumption,
thereby reducing line losses (energy lost as heat in the transmission process) and
emissions from large-scale baseload generators. Distributed generation has been
recognized as a clean energy resource with valuable implications for future energy
markets. See ASHWANI KUMAR, ZONAL-BASED APPROACH FOR OPTIMAL LOCATION OF
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN POOL-BASED DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS
AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS
(2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1539296 [https://perma.cc/A2FL-9FS3]; THOMAS BOURGEOIS ET AL.,
supra note 209.
210. Nemtzow et al., supra note 13, at 44. Reductions in greenhouse gases
were most noticeable in the summer months because demand response shifted
consumption to non-summer months. Id. Because less electricity was consumed

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4

32

2016]

DUAL ENVIRONMENTALISM

197

nitrous oxide, sulfur dioxide, and carbon dioxide attributable to
demand response programs.211 In comparing the effect of demand
response on diesel- versus gas-fired generation, however, Synapse
noted only “small but significant impacts” on emissions.212
Nevertheless, the study ultimately found large-scale demand
response mechanisms significantly reduced most criteria pollutant
emissions in the New England Region.213 While the results of the
Synapse study could not be extrapolated beyond the New England
region, the study nonetheless supports the theory underlying this
note – that state-level demand response must coincide with a
federal-oversight model in order to affect an environmental
regulatory scheme.
In January 2015, the Brattle Group, Inc. completed a study on
behalf of EnerNOC analyzing the benefits of demand response.214
The results included a generally smaller geographic footprint of the
grid.215 Such findings were primarily the result of reduced
generator total emissions, including reduced criteria and
hazardous pollutants.216 The study advised that “these reductions
would be particularly valuable in designated ‘non-attainment
areas’ where pre-determined emissions levels cannot be
exceeded.”217 To the extent that reductions in peak demand also
avoided new generation, demand response could be credited with
reduced impacts on wildlife habitats and sensitive ecosystems.218
Additionally, if utilities incorporated time-varying retail rates to
institute demand response, a strong rate aimed at skimming peak

in the summer, less greenhouse gases were emitted in the generation of
electricity, and thus, less emissions were present during prime ozone- and smogforming sunny months. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. In this particular study, Synapse did not explore the emissions
reductions associated with shifting consumption from gas- to renewable-powered
generation resources. Id.
213. Id.
214. RYAN HLEDIK & AHMAD FARUQUI, VALUING DEMAND RESPONSE:
INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES, CASE STUDIES, AND APPLICATIONS 26-27 (2015),
http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/005/343/original/Valuing_D
emand_Response_-_International_Best_Practices__Case_Studies__and_
Applications.pdf?1468964700 [https://perma.cc/N29P-REQ7].
215. Id. at 27.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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load could aid in the implementation of distributed energy
resources.219 “For example, a strong time-of-use rate could improve
the economics of rooftop solar by aligning the higher priced peak
pricing period with the time of the highest output from the
system.”220 Numerous other studies have supported these key
findings.221
VI. DESIGNING AN ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATORY SCHEME
Wholesale and retail demand response mechanisms are not
mutually exclusive. While the Federal Power Act creates distinct
spheres of jurisdiction between wholesale and retail markets, the
division of power between the state and federal government has
not been so clear.222 Perhaps the decade-old struggle to draw
jurisdictional lines has been settled by the Court’s embrace of
cooperative federalism inherent in the FPA: “the [FPA] makes
federal and state powers ‘complimentary’ and ‘comprehensive,’ so
that there will be no ‘gaps’ for private interests to subvert the
public welfare. Or said otherwise, the statute prevents the creation
of any regulatory ‘no man’s land’.”223 States aiming to incorporate
wholesale demand response alongside retail demand response
programs in the aftermath of EPSA can look to the Supreme Court,
California, and New York for examples of demand response in the
context of environmental regulatory schemes.

219. Id.
220. HLEDIK & FARUQUI, supra note 214, at 29.
221. See GREAT PLAINS INST., ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF DEMAND
RESPONSE (2014), http://www.betterenergy.org/files/DR%20Fact%20Sheet%202%
20Environmental%20Benefits%20of%20DR.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLT4-W92K];
see MONITORING ANALYTICS, THE 2017/2018 RPM BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION:
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES (2014), http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/
Reports/2014/IMM_20172018_RPM_BRA_Sensitivity_Analyses_20140710.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NLT4-W92K]; see JAMES MCANANY, 2014 DEMAND RESPONSE
OPERATIONS MARKET ACTIVITY REPORT: OCTOBER 2014 (2014), http://www.pjm.
com/~/media/markets-ops/dsr/2014-dsr-activity-report-20141008.ashx
[https://perma.cc/6D5K-R3HS].
222. Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric
Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1788-89 (2016).
223. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 779 (2016) (citations
omitted).
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A. Strengths and Weaknesses of Wholesale v. Retail
Demand Response
FERC’s broad authority could be used to implement wideranging environmental and energy objectives.224 So long as the
environmental and energy goals pursued by FERC have a direct or
integral impact on wholesale markets, it cannot be said to be
beyond its jurisdiction.225 This gives FERC broad discretion to
incorporate environmentally sustainable objectives into wholesale
level demand response programs, to trump less environmentally
beneficial state law when there is a direct conflict, and even
influence the retail market to the extent that retail activities
impact wholesale electricity markets.226
FERC could use its broad authority to incorporate a new
positive value system into wholesale electricity markets.227 In
determining the wholesale price of electricity resources, FERC can
incorporate environmental and social externality values.228 In
placing a carbon adder on the wholesale price of coal and natural
gas,229 while offering renewable energy credits for solar, wind, and
hydroelectric power, FERC can effectively charge unsustainable
fossil fuel electricity generators for their emissions.230
FERC’s authority to regulate the wholesale market must be
exercised to fill the gaps where state jurisdiction ends. Federal
initiatives that direct ISOs/RTOs to implement demand response
programs that incentivize the use of renewable over nonrenewable
energy resources (without hindering market entry into state-level
demand response) have quantifiable widespread environmental
benefits.231
224. Eisen, supra note 222, at 1783.
225. Id. at 1805.
226. Id. at 1813.
227. Id. at 1783.
228. Id. at 1848.
229. A carbon adder is an additional charge (usually a few cents per
megawatt hour) added to the wholesale price of an energy commodity to
internalize the externality cost of carbon emissions released from the combustion
of that resource. Id. at 1788, 1834.
230. See Eisen, supra note 222, at 1834.
231. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BENEFITS OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY
MARKETS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM: A REPORT TO THE U.S.
CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 1252 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 xv
(2006), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/DOE_ Bene
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Conversely, some scholars argue that FERC’s jurisdiction,
while wide in scope, is not so wide as to transform the electric grid
into a less environmentally intensive entity.232 The Department of
Energy (DOE) has even cautioned policymakers in attributing
environmental benefits to demand response.233 The DOE’s caveat
only applies a marginal percent to global environmental benefits.
Based on studies from the early 2000’s, the DOE determined that
environmental gains from demand response are “dependent on the
emissions profiles and marginal operating costs of the generation
plants in specific regions.”234 Since 2006, however, the value of
localized benefits stemming from demand response has been
recognized.235 In its Report to Congress on the benefits of demand
response in the electricity market, the DOE did not wholly throw
out demand response as potentially environmentally beneficial.
Rather, the DOE advised that in order to appropriately assess the
possible environmental benefits of demand response, the amount
of emissions reductions during peak demand – as a result of a
curtailed response – must be weighed against increases in
emissions during off-peak hours, as well as increased use of
distributed generation.236 In balancing these considerations,
localized environmental benefits have a larger marginal impact on
the local grid system.237 Cumulatively, localized benefits may have
a marginal effect on the larger grid system.238
B. Reaping the Environmental Benefits of Demand
Response
Numerous market and policy mechanisms, when deployed
under the right conditions, can achieve environmental benefits.239
To optimize environmental objectives, the electricity market must

fits_of_Demand_Response_in_Electricity_Markets_and_Recommendations_for_
Achieving_Them_Report_to_Congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V8G-Z6N7].
232. See Jeffrey Chow et al., Energy Resources and Global Development, 302
SCI. 1528 (2003).
233. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 231, at 29.
234. Id. at 29.
235. See generally id.
236. Id. at 29.
237. See id.
238. See Nemtzow et al., supra note 13.
239. See generally Chow et al., supra note 232.
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be transformed.240 Both wholesale and retail markets must employ
demand response programs that strategically curtail demand to
reduce environmental impacts through conservation. To effectively
internalize the externality costs of unsustainable electricity
generation, policy makers must institute a national environmental
regulatory scheme that fosters localized benefits. The breadth of
FERC’s jurisdiction over practices affecting the wholesale market
gives it great discretion to equip states with the demand-side tools
to sustainably manage energy consumption.241 Due to the
concentrated nature of demand response benefits, end-use
customers at the local level must have a market incentive to prefer
renewable energy.242 FERC’s ability to regulate wholesale energy
prices gives it leeway to institute those market incentives.243 When
customers see increasing reductions in their monthly energy bills,
they begin to form more sustainable consumption habits over
time.244 Consumption patterns at the local level affect needed
supply at the wholesale level.245 Thus, conscious consumers can
shape national energy resource use, but to do so, they must see the
true cost of that energy.
The federal regulatory model must comprise aspects of
cooperative federalism, whereby state governments, state
agencies, and FERC exercise non-conflicting jurisdiction. Both
state and federal entities must retain their distinctive
jurisdictional roles, but rather than being mutually exclusive, the
presence of both powers must strengthen the overall regulatory
scheme. A rule is stronger when enforced by both states and the

240. See PETER H. KIND, PATHWAYS TO A 21ST CENTURY ELECTRIC UTILITY 6
(2005), https://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/pathway-to-a-21st-century-electr
ic-utility [https://perma.cc/GH45-6GQ9].
241. See Eisen, supra note 222, at 1792.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1794.
244. See id. New York is doing this through the REV initiative. Order
Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy Framework, Case 14M-0101, 2 (May 19, 2016). Track 2 of the order is aimed at creating a “modern
regulatory model” that changes the way utilities are compensated so as to promote
more efficient and environmentally sustainable utility business practices. Id.
Rather than the tradition ratemaking case used in reaching regulated utility
rates, the new mechanism will allow utilities to make profits from practices that
incentive distributed generation deployment and the use of demand management
practices like demand response. Id.
245. See Eisen, supra note 222, at 1794.
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federal government than by one entity alone. States must inform
federal environmental regulation in order to maximize local
environmental benefits. In the areas where states cannot regulate,
federal agencies must extend their jurisdiction in a way that
promotes environmental sustainability. The federal regulatory
model should aim to reduce the negative environmental impacts
associated with energy production, generation, and consumption to
the same, or even greater degree than the market would
incidentally achieve as a result of scarcity-induced price increases
and other spikes in demand.246 To determine how stringent
regulation must be to achieve those results, the externality costs of
the entire electric generating system must be quantified and
internalized. Studies determining the social cost of carbon and
tests for quantifying social values from various perspectives should
be utilized in implementing policy mechanisms like
“environmental standards, fuel and emission taxes, subsidies for
renewable energy production, mandated diversified energy
portfolios, and emission permit-trading schemes.”247 New York is
doing this through the use of zero-emission credits (“ZECs”) and
renewable energy credits (“RECs”) in emissions-trading schemes
that use the social cost of carbon to set the price at which credits
may be bought and sold.
FERC, in instituting Order 745, realized the inadequacy of
demand response in the wholesale market and the threat to the
system’s ability to meet peak demand. While FERC has broad
discretion to regulate wholesale market rates, it has limited
authority to consider environmental objectives directly when
determining whether wholesale electricity rates are just and
reasonable. Thus, in order to ensure system reliability, demand
response must be rationalized by the effects environmental
benefits will have on the electric system. For instance, instead of a
carbon adder, the wholesale price of energy could contain a
“reliability adder.”248 Adding this cost would place a direct value
on the system benefit, focusing on the grid benefits of demand
response in order to achieve environmental benefits.249 Such

246.
247.
248.
249.

Chow et al., supra note 232, at 1530.
Id.
Eisen, supra note 222, at 1839-40.
Id. at 1840.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4

38

2016]

DUAL ENVIRONMENTALISM

203

market mechanisms would allow the wholesale price of electricity
to more accurately be carried through to the customer, allowing the
end user to form sustainable consumption patterns.250
Where FERC cannot directly regulate the energy sector with
environmental sustainability in mind, state and local entities will
play an important role. New York State has recognized the value
of municipal involvement and customer engagement. In its REV
proceeding, New York identified “mix[ed] traditional outreach
methods . . . social media and community-based marketing
approaches . . . [and] accommodating customer diversity in the
design of demand side management programs” as best practices for
customer education.251 The value derived from engaging the public
can be attributed to input on “cultural and behavioral factors that
affect energy use.”252 Knowledge of these local characteristics
better informs policy makers of customer consumption, allowing
for more productive incentives and technologies to achieve
environmental benefits.253
Retail-level demand response and state-level environmental
regulation has even greater weight following FERC v. EPSA. In
reversing the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court has
effectively prevented the future of distributed generation and
behind-the-meter technologies from falling exclusively into the
regulatory hands of the states.254 While this does not altogether
sound like cause for environmentalist celebration, vacating Order
745 would have ultimately stripped FERC of the ability to regulate
rooftop solar, on-site electricity storage, and other demand-side
technologies.255 If FERC was prohibited from factoring these
demand-shaping entities into the wholesale price of energy, energy
efficiency and demand management technologies would not be
competitive with less expensive, but more environmentally
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251. FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 30.
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SMART ELEC. POWER ALL. (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.solarelectricpower.org/
utility-solar-blog/2016/january/why-ferc-745-is-about-more-than-demandresponse.aspx [https://perma.cc/LV97-S5U7].
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damaging energy resources.256 Optimal environmental regulation
in the aftermath of FERC v. EPSA, must thus strike a balance
between state and federal authority that anticipates the
jurisdictional gaps created by judicial and legislative decisions. For
instance, states may be better suited to directly incorporate
environmentally-geared demand response programs, incentives for
renewable and distributed generation, and customer-tailored
energy-saving technologies. Conversely, FERC is better suited to
implement demand response that will indirectly accrue
environmental benefits by shaping wholesale and capacity market
forces, as reflected in decreased retail rates.
The environmentalist’s ideal regulatory scheme must draw on
the strengths and weaknesses of the division of power between the
state and federal government to maximize benefits. The
infeasibility of demand planning at the state level provides an
opportunity for FERC oversight.257 The impracticality of
conducting supply-only planning at the federal level necessitates
the need for cooperative federalism.258 A system designed to the
contrary would hardly be affordable nor effective at achieving
environmental sustainability.259 Despite decades of jurisdictional
confusion over where the realm of state power ends and federal
oversight begins, the solution to an environmentally-conscious
energy regulatory scheme must strike a balance between these two
spheres of influence.
VII. CONCLUSION
The era of cooperative federalism in demand response is just
beginning. While the Supreme Court has granted FERC authority
to regulate wholesale demand response affecting retail markets,
states have additional power to determine what retail entities may
administer demand response, if at all. In the aftermath of FERC v.
EPSA, FERC will undoubtedly face the growing number of statelevel programs that are popping up alongside, and sometimes
overlapping with, wholesale level demand response programs.
States will continue to fill the gaps by expanding on the already
256.
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increasing number of retail-level demand response programs.
Thus, with both state and federal governments retaining
jurisdiction over some aspect of demand response, the most
environmentally-sound regulatory schemes will take advantage of
this rare opportunity to enforce energy conservation at both the
state and federal levels. In the coming decade, bottom-up and topdown reforms are necessary to realize dual environmentalism: the
most responsible mechanism to manage energy consumption and
its associated environmental impacts for the future.
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